A NIGHT IN DECEMBER
by H. Peter Kuiper

NARRATOR: The rain has waned, and now the streets are clean and waiting. But only the wind is coming. The last lingering leaves have larghettoed down, and now in the wind the trees are bowing and creaking like a man embarrassed and beaten, like an old man exposing his bones.

The sun shines once more and sizzles into the sea.

The city turns on its lights, and goes home to play: "With popcorn and tinsel and candles so bright, we shall be happy, it's Christmas tonight." It is a thoughtful city: the stockings are hung by the chimney with care.

And now in the streets only the aimless, the raging, the wounded are walking. Is it for them the streets are clean, and waiting?

I do not know.
I only listen:

OLD MAN ON CRUTCHES: Christmas Eve. O little town of Bethlehem, how still we see... Doggone. Where have all the young men gone... Try to remember the time in December when nights were warm, and love... Love! What a laugh. How long has it been now. Lemme see. Oh well, why bother. Doggone, it's cold tonight. Guess it has to be, though, since it's Christmas Eve. If it wasn't cold, they wouldn't need fireplaces, and they gotta have those for the stockings. Hah! The trouble with people is that they just don't care. Try to remember the night in December... CONTINUED ON PAGE 2

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Hey, buddy, gotta dime for, say friend, it's Christmas eve, ya gotta quarter for a cup a coffee?

WELL-DRESSED MAN: Well, my good man, you know there are places where you can go and get warm and be fed and have coffee and find a nice bed, you know that don't you? There are places which exist just to take care of people like, I mean people with difficulties. Surely my good man, you understand, I must hurry home to my family, it's Christmas Eve, you know.

OLD MAN: Yea, I know.

WELL-DRESSED MAN: I'm sure you would. Now just walk down a few blocks, down by the business section, I'm sure an officer can tell you where it is, it's not hard to find, I've heard about it. Merry Christmas, now.

NARRATOR: So the well-dressed man hurried off to his car, and as he drove he thought about how clean the streets were, and how it gives one a good feeling to do a good deed, even if it's a small matter like giving an old man directions. "Nothing like a good clean feeling to help you celebrate Christmas," he said to himself as he turned up the heater of his car.

The man with the crutches walked on, but now he wasn't singing. His armpits were beginning to hurt, and his hands were aching from clutching his crutches. A whistle of a distant train reminded him of his accident seven years before, and, as always when he thought of his leg, he cast a grateful glance to heaven for saving his life. "Not very smart to argue with a train," he told himself for the thousandth time. But as the whistle died away to be replaced in his awareness by the sounds of laughter and singing coming from homes along his way, he wondered if he shouldn't have argued with greater force. He wanted to rest, but there was no place to sit down.

After he had gone a couple of blocks he came to a church. It was a grand old building, with a huge stained glass window. The crippled man thought to himself, "I'm an old man, and this is an old church, I'm sure I could rest here on the steps awhile. I've never harmed a church in my life."

So there he rested, and looked up at the stained glass window. It was circular, and as the old man followed it around (it was lighted from inside) he realized that it told a story. There was the birthscene, the manger. Then there was Jesus sitting on a hillside, teaching a crowd of people. This was followed by a picture of Jesus before Pilate, wearing a crown of thorns. Last, there was the scene of Christ ascending into heaven. In the center of the window there was a cross.

As the old man looked at the cross he realized that something was wrong: at the point where the two boards of the cross were supposed to meet there was a hole. Someone had thrown a rock through the window at this point.

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Then, as the old man watched, a small bird flew out of the hole and into the darkness. The man shuddered, and said to himself, "I'd better shove on. Not even a church is safe here."

Shortly after he started walking, the old man realized that someone had overtaken him. He turned, and saw at his side a very old woman. She smiled at him, but said nothing. She simply slowed to his pace, and kept smiling, as if she had something too big for her little mouth to say. When they came to the corner, she sat down on the bench by a bus stop.

The old man thought: "She isn't very safe here all alone. I'd better sit here with her until the bus comes." Then, as he sat down beside her, he said, as though he had known her for a long time. "Pretty cold tonight."

OLD WOMAN: "Yes, but it was warm in the church, where I just came from, and oh, it was lovely. They gave a Christmas play tonight. Afterwards I went up and sat in the balcony, and looked at the window. It's a shame what happened to it, but it's still beautiful."

OLD MAN: "Yes, I know."

NARRATOR: In a short while the bus came, and the old man was sad because he knew that he could not stay with the old woman, and sad because he couldn't enjoy the rest and comfort of the bus when his hands and his foot were sore from walking. The bus had a sign saying "End of Line" and the old man would gladly have ridden to the end of the line, wherever it was, to be able to sit next to the old woman and enjoy the rest and warmth of the bus.

The old woman had boarded the bus now. But the bus was not moving. The old man was standing at the open door, like a camera on a tripod, trying to focus on a warm and vanishing dream. The driver looked at him for a tall minute. Then he said,


NARRATOR: The bus driver then pulled the hand brake, and went down and helped the old man into the bus. After they were both seated, the old woman went on with her story.

OLD WOMAN: "As I sat there, looking at the window of the church, my mind wandered back to the time many years ago when we had put on a Christmas play in church. It was called, "No Room in the Inn." I played the part of the innkeeper's wife. I was the one who persuaded him to make Mary and Joseph stay in the manger. Ever since that time I've felt kind of guilty every time I think about it. I know I shouldn't feel that way, because I was only acting a part. But I do. However, the longer I looked at the window, tonight, the better I felt. You saw the window, didn't you? Do you know what I mean?"

OLD MAN: "Yes, I saw it. But I don't understand it. I don't understand why someone had to put a hole in it. I don't understand a lot of things. Take my leg, for example. I was trying to get on this train in Oklahoma City, just seven years ago tonight. Going CONTINUED ON PAGE 4
to go home to St. Louis and visit my family. But I slipped. Took my leg right off. I don't know much about God, but I know that Someone spared my life. Never could understand why, though, after all I've done. After the accident I had a lot harder time finding work. Before I liked to travel, never liked to stay in one place long, got restless. But now I have to travel. Hard to find work.

"Never could figure out why He spared my life. But every once and a while a song comes, or a person to talk to. And at night, often, there are dreams. But I don't understand it. I just can't understand it."

NARRATOR: They rode on then, for some time in silence. There were tears in the old woman's eyes, but the old man was strong. They passed many houses brightly decorated with Christmas lights, and then in the business section there were lights and wreaths and Santa Clauses.

Finally the silence was broken by the bus driver: "End of the line. Merry Christmas. The old woman helped the old man move clumsily to the door, where the driver helped him down.

OLD MAN: "Thank you, thank you. Say, can you direct me to the rescue..."

OLD WOMAN (cutting him off): "I can. Come with me. It's Christmas."

NARRATOR: The old man looked at her. And as he looked at her he realized that he had been given a new night to remember, a night when the stars were nearer and warmer, a night he'd never forget. And from that knowledge, as if from a well buried deep inside him, there arose the awareness of why he was alive. Then softly, warmly he let his weathered voice sing:

OLD MAN: "Away in a manger, no crib for his bed
The little Lord Jesus lay down his sweet head;
The stars in the sky looked down where he lay,
The little Lord Jesus asleep on the hay."

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EDITORIAL

Where's Temple?
AGAINST ACTIVISM
by James W. Brown

One of the most curious of the phenomena characteristic of Puller is the evident embarrassment caused by its reputation for academic excellence. There is considerable pressure from my fellow students to make these years at Puller years of activism rather than years of intense academic preparation. This pressure manifests itself in many different ways: criticism of the seminary for not emphasizing devotional activities to a greater extent; criticism of faculty members for not being more actively and personally involved with the students; great involvement of students in extra-curricular activity of a Christian, social, or cultural sort; and, a not unexpected corollary, bitter complaint that the academic load is too heavy or the language requirements too hard.

I feel that the morale of the students and faculty is sufficiently disturbed that the whole matter should be aired and we should define the purpose of a theological seminary such as Puller and then strive toward that goal with a singularity of purpose.

I. THE PURPOSE OF A THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

1. Trade School? "Trade school mentality" is, perhaps, an unkind epithet to fling about, but I suspect that it would be accepted almost enthusiastically as a Fuller Seminary slogan by many who are enrolled. We are here to learn a trade, it is true. We must learn the methodological mechanics behind a successful church program. But we are here primarily to study the theory and ground of such things—to study 'practics' and more important, theology in depth. There are at least two things about "trade school mentality" that cheat us as theological students: 1) it inspires courses that penetrate very little deeper than the average pastor in the institutional Church needs to keep his 'machine' running, robbing us of the kind of interaction with creative thinkers that might enable us to advance beyond the present state; 2) it seems to encourage activism that finds Fuller students running hither and yon doing everything but not studying anything—not even 'practics' or homiletics, let alone hermeneutics, language, or (pardon) theology and its relation to our culture—in depth.

2. Scholarly preparation? There is nothing in the stated "Philosophy of Fuller Seminary" to encourage activity which might compromise academic productivity. In fact the thinking of the seminary founders is summed up rather, "If there is any place where academic mediocrity should be forthrightly resisted, it is in a theological seminary. To give God less than our best is a plain insult." The Fuller catalogue says, "Theology still has its self-grounded justification, and can lay claim to be seriously studied in its own right....Christianity necessarily implies theology. The question is not whether there is to be theology; it is what kind of theology there will be." If a man is to be

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graduated from Fuller anything but a bungling mishandler of the basic tools of a Biblical theologian, he must dedicate himself to thousands of hours of labor in his study. If he wants to relate intelligently what he has learned to the domestic or foreign culture in which he has chosen to serve, he must surely nearly double that time of study.

In Ionesco’s Absurdist drama ‘The Bald Soprano’ a highly satirical dialogue takes place:

Fire Chief: Shall I tell you some stories?
Mrs. Smith: Oh, by all means, how charming of you.
Mr. Smith, Mrs. Martin, Mr. Martin: Yes, yes, some stories, hurrah!
(They applaud.)
Mr. Smith: And what is even more interesting is the fact that the firemen’s stories are all true, and they’re based on experience.
Fire Chief: I speak from my own experience. Truth, nothing but the truth. No fiction.
Mr. Martin: That’s right. Truth is never found in books, only in life.
Mrs. Smith: Begin!

How many at Fuller Seminary imply as much! The fact is that one can be saved many blunders in experience if one has prepared himself to be a knowledgeable gentleman before he enters the activity of his ministry.

The biographies of great English and American ministers which I am familiar provide example after example of young men who disciplined themselves in their youth to obtain an intellectual preparation which is quite beyond the ideal of anyone I know currently studying at Fuller. I cannot escape the feeling that our judgement will be severe and our ministries less than they could have been if we waste part of the time in these once-offered years of preparation by staffing local churches, demonstrating too frequently our social concern, and over-indulging ourselves socially and culturally.

iii.

Cannot both academic excellence and activism be emphasized at Fuller? To me the tension between these two poles is much like that between ‘God and mammon’ in that it is difficult to get submerged in both at the same time. I feel that both might have a place at Fuller with proper scheduling, as I shall point out below, but the present system of pressure for activism while at the same time mastering academic disciplines is a poor method.

II. SOME MODEST PROPOSALS:

1. The first proposal that I would suggest is that the seminary demand a limitation of extra-curricular student activity. This proposal is most seriously an indictment against the Seminary and evangelical Christianity for failure to properly care for its seminarians. The recent Faculty Lectureship Series by Professor Schnackenburg affords a telling illustration. These stimulating lectures were very poorly attended by our seminarians. At an evening seminar in Biblical Theology following the Lectureship, Dr. Ladd asked the students why so few had attended. The answer was appalling. A great number who would have attended were forced to absent themselves because they had to work at secular odd jobs! These students, the hope of Evangelicalism, were missing important lectures so that they could drive trucks, work as clerks, or flip hamburgers in order to keep themselves alive. CONTINUED ON PAGE 7
and pay the increased tuition fees. There is no man or committee to be aware and concerned for the schedule of each student. The need for a Dean of Students is becoming critical, for the students, driven as many are by a strong Puritan ethic, invariably imagine that they can stay out of debt by hard work and thus condemn themselves to over-extension. By the very nature of the case, it is always theological education, the very reason for being here, that suffers. These financial problems must be solved! Academic apathy cannot be conquered where students are forced to be overly involved in extra-curricular activity. The case of each student must be known and evaluated by someone with executive power so that the man who consistently comes in from an evening job at midnight and works at his desk until three o'clock will be prevented from subjecting himself to such an intolerable schedule and will be put in a position where his drive will be used to accomplish outstanding academic preparation. A well published list of scholarships based upon clearly articulated academic qualifications should be posted to encourage students to gain financial support by academic achievement rather than academic distraction.

A second matter included under this first proposal is the limiting by the Seminary of distracting field work indulged by seminarians. If a man is barely able to manage competence in the theological encyclopedia when applying all of his energy toward his required disciplines, it is stupid for him to take on the responsibility of a youth group or other activity. But if activistic student pressure is not countered by wise faculty counsel, the struggling seminarian invariably seems to succumb to the myth that if you aren't a Christian activist your soul will dry up during the seminary years. The fact is that one must sacrifice some personal relationship to achieve the necessary intellectual preparation. But put even a highly rarified theologian in a parish and the demands of interpersonal relationship quickly revive his soul, if indeed it appeared to have withdrawn. But the revived soul will not be a weak resource little able to help the parishioners. On the contrary, it will be a well prepared soul of great inspiration.

ii.

My second proposal is more subtly related to the activist atmosphere. I propose that measures be taken to establish respect for the faculty and for human dignity at Fuller. American churchmen should be at least a conservative factor in the breakdown of language, dignity and etiquette of English culture rather than the avant-garde. Fuller Seminary has attracted a remarkably fine faculty for an Evangelical school; deference should certainly be paid these men. It is quite disgusting to hear students talk of faculty members as though they were peers and constantly demand that they relate as 'buddies.' Faculty members must sacrifice personal relationship to sustain high levels of proficiency in their fields of specialization. Students can only benefit by sitting under a man who has sufficient time for research to enable him to remain competent in his field. The student therefore ought to be the ally of the faculty member in his struggle to retain sufficient research time rather than one who pressures for further dissipation of faculty time. A corollary to respect for faculty and for the dignity of fellow students is putting an end to the waste of lecture time with pedantic questions or uninformed questions whose answers are to be found in Encyclopaediae or required texts. Finally, an improvement of gentlemanly manners and posture would bring a welcome breath of dignity to the lecture hall and chapel.

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Thirdly, I propose a modification of the core curriculum. Problems are becoming evident in the new curriculum. Firstly, it has been observed by many that the core program makes it almost impossible to transfer to or from Fuller. If this is discouraging to enrolled students it must form a deterrent to prospective students. Secondly, it appears to the student enrolled in the core program that some areas are having difficulty finding enough relevant material to fill up the time, while others are crowding almost too much into too short a time. Generally speaking, I propose that there are some areas of the core program from which busy-work could be trimmed and that the whole program should be brought to a uniformly high quality of scholarship.

Practically speaking, I would like to see several things initiated. I would like to see the first two years of training become years of intense academic training in which the intellectual tools are mastered. The third year, in my opinion, should be devoted to 'practical specialization.' In practice this would mean that the student would be consciously protected from distraction in the first two years while he attained language mastery, hermeneutical proficiency, and a thorough knowledge of his Christian heritage. The third year should then be a true taste of the practical situation in which the student is to minister—an internship while still under the guidance of the seminary faculty. The 'practical' courses have been the notoriously weak section of the curriculum. I am convinced that this is because of the impossibility of teaching practical methodology in a lecture room situation. In such courses theory constantly cries out for application. Therefore, in the third year men who are going to be evangelists should work with evangelists under seminary supervision; men who are to be preachers should work, not as youth leaders, but with ministers; missionaries should work with the type of mission that they intend to serve; and students headed for scholarship should be allowed to continue their technical studies without distraction. The third year would be the time for strenuous activism.

All groups should now be pleased with the exception of one. I feel that it is a sad commentary on the level of appreciation of the relation of Christianity and culture at Fuller Seminary when students must take the initiative and their extra-curricular time to create a seminary chorus or to read literature and drama of contemporary impact and discuss their implications for a theologian. Extra-curricular activities must be drastically curtailed. But these cultural activities are too relevant for the Christian to be ignored; they should not be extra-curricular. ////

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AUGUSTINE ON THE ORIGIN OF SIN
by Thomas B. Talbott

Probably no difficulty facing the Christian philosopher is more profound than the problem of evil, and perhaps no one has wrestled more earnestly with this baffling problem than the great St. Augustine of Hippo. He defends the following theses: (1) Good is equatable with existence or being, so that everything that exists is good by

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definition. (2) Evil has no positive nature at all. It is merely a lack or absence of good. Natural evil is a deprivation residing in some good nature created by God, and moral evil is a defect residing in some good will created by God. (3) God is simple Being; that is, He possesses nothing which He might lose. Therefore, evil is neither capable of harming Him nor co-eternal with Him. Absolute evil is nothing. (4) That which is begotten of God (Christ) is God and thus immutable; but that which is created out of nothing by God, since it participates in non-being as well as being, is necessarily mutable and hence corruptible. Consequently, both natural and moral evil are metaphysically possible in a universe created by God ex nihilo.

Such, in its simplest form, is Augustine's general argumentative structure. Each point deserves considerable expansion and analysis, but in this paper I shall confine my attention to a single issue: namely, that of the origin of moral evil.

Moral evil, or sin, arises whenever a relative being willfully turns from the absolute Being to himself. This, Augustine labels as "pride," and it exists as a deficiency in the subject. But pride, as the abandoning of a higher good for a lower one, is not evil because the lower good is in some sense evil. On the contrary, it is the turning itself, and not the thing turned to, which is evil; and the turning is a consequence of a deficient will.

But how do we account for the first defective will? Here Augustine appeals to an original misuse of freedom. Man was created with a free will, and a will which is morally free involves the possibility of moral rebellion. But this possibility of falling away, which is a necessary consequence of moral freedom, does not imply that in itself free will is evil. Free will is yet an instrumental good. It is the necessary precondition for man's greatest happiness -- i.e., the free clinging of the will to the immutable Good. Moreover, its essence is good, but its essence is also moral freedom; and the proper function of moral freedom involves both the power to cling to the supreme Good and the power to fall away. Therefore, it was good for God to create that which might fall away, for that which might fall away is good -- good not in the sense that it is incapable of falling from the good, but good in the sense that this possibility of falling from the good is itself good.

Free will, then, is the key concept in Augustine's handling of the problem of the origin of sin, but in order to render this concept intelligible, he must first address himself to two crucial questions: (1) How was it that the first bad will came to turn away from God, and (2) what is the relation between man's free will and the Divine foreknowledge?

(1) Understandably, Augustine is not always consistent when discussing the difficult question of how a good will created by God might come to fail. His analysis, however, is both penetrating and convincing. Rightly perceiving that there can be no efficient cause of an evil will, his reasoning, in my opinion, is decisive for all ages. The argument by which he establishes his conclusion is so rigorous that one dares not tamper with it.

If one seeks for the efficient cause of the fall of the bad angels' evil will, none is to be found. For, what can make the will bad when it is the will itself which makes an action bad? Thus, an evil will is the efficient cause of a bad action, but there is no efficient cause of an evil will. If there is such a cause, it either has or has not a will. If

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it has, then that will is either good or bad. If good, one would have to be foolish enough to conclude that a good will makes a bad will. In that case, a good will becomes the cause of sin—which is utterly absurd. On the other hand, if the hypothetical cause of a bad will has itself a bad will, I would have to ask what made this will bad, and, to put an end to the inquiry: What made the first bad will bad? Now, the fact is that there is no first bad will that was made bad by any other bad will—it was made bad by itself.

We need not complete Augustine's beautiful and decisive argument by reducing to absurdity the two remaining alternatives—i.e., that something other than will is the ultimate cause of an evil will, or that there exists an eternal evil will. Although Augustine's attempt to refute these alternatives in terms of his Neo-Platonic metaphysics is not altogether satisfactory, they can gain no credence from within the context of Christianity; and it is only in this context that we are considering the problem of evil. Therefore, we must conclude that Augustine has made his point, and made it well. God is not the cause of an evil will, even though he grants it the power to turn away if it so chooses; and to look behind the decision arrived at by the will in its fall for a further reason why it fell is not only to look for something that can never be found, but is necessarily to think in nonsensical terms. The decision is the reason, and the only reason, for the choice as well as for the fall. To say that Adam arrived at a decision is to explain the event, and it is nonsensical to seek to explain an explanation. Explanations explain events, but are not themselves explainable—otherwise they would not be explanations. The choice, then, has no efficient cause, and, in terms of Augustine's metaphysics, becomes a "deficient" cause; that is, its effects are deficient and thus evil.

Unfortunately, Augustine does not always accept the implications of his own analysis. Sometimes his metaphysics betrays him, and sometimes he seems unable to avoid thinking in causal categories. When he writes, for example, that "the will itself, because it is a created will, wickedly and inordinately seeks the inferior being," he almost implies that man's sin is a necessary consequence of his finitude. This implication is reinforced by his statement that "a nature falls away from that which Is because the nature was made out of nothing." But if man's sin is a necessary consequence of his finitude, why is he considered morally responsible and worthy of punishment? Again, how does Augustine reconcile his denial of an efficient cause of an evil will with his statement "that nothing happens without a preceding efficient cause?" Some causes are voluntary, of course, but the point about voluntary causes is that they occur without preceding causes. To argue, as Augustine does—(1) that there is no efficient cause for a bad will; (2) that the bad angels were made bad by a bad will; and (3) that the reason the bad angels fell and the good angels did not is either that the bad angels received less grace of divine love or that the good angels "were increasingly aided to reach that plentitude of beatitude which made them certain that they would never fall"—is a flagrant violation of logic. Augustine is thus on far safer ground when he writes that God is "the giver of all powers—though He is not the maker of all choices. Evil choices are not from Him, for they are contrary to the nature which is from Him." 

(2) Since an appeal to free will is an important part of Augustine's solution to the problem of the origin of moral evil, he must...
address himself to the profound problem of the relation between human freedom and Divine sovereignty. If from eternity God knows beforehand every human action, then in what sense is it meaningful to speak of voluntary human volitions? This question embodies the objection to theism raised by Cicero. God's foreknowledge, if it is genuine knowledge, implies that every event in the future will occur in the same order as it was known by God. What is worse, no event other than those known by God can possibly occur in the future; thus it is nonsensical to affirm any form of undetermined freedom. No man has the power to act in any manner other than that in which he does act, for Divine omniscience implies fatalism. As theologians, then, we must choose between free will and Divine omniscience. We cannot affirm both, for the affirmation of one is the denial of the other.

Although Augustine's attempt to meet Cicero's argument involves him in some of the same inconsistencies previously noted, his analysis does contain the basic solution to the problem. In opposition to Cicero he argues that even if God is omniscient "no one sins because God foreknew that he would sin. ...He whose foreknowledge cannot be deceived foresees, not the man's fate or fortune or what not, but that the man himself would be responsible."10 This argument, in my opinion, is decisive. If John chose X at t2, then it was true at t1 that John would choose X at t2, and, therefore, God knew at t1 that John would choose X at t2; but God knew at t1 that John would choose X at t2 only because it was true at t1 that John would choose X at t2, and it was true at t1 that John would choose X at t2 only because, as a matter of fact, John did choose X at t2. If, however, John had chosen Y at t2, this too would have been known by God at t1.

It does not follow, therefore, that there is no power in our will because God foreknew what was to be the choice in our will. For, He who had this foreknowledge had some foreknowledge. Furthermore, if He who foresaw what was to be in our will foresaw, not nothing, but something, it follows that there is a power in our will, even though He foresaw it.11

This argument of Augustine's can be carried a step further and rendered irrefutable. The object of knowledge is truth; and since truth transcends all temporal, spatial relations, it is meaningless to attribute a time to truth. Previously we asserted that if John chose X at t2, it was true at t1 that John chose X at t2. Such an assertion is misleading if it suggests that the truth that John chose X at t2 is itself temporally located at t1 or t2 or t11. If at t1 Bill asserts the statement, "At t2 John will choose X," Bill's statement will, of course, be true—but eternally true. We cannot meaningfully attribute t1 to the truth that John chooses X at t2. As Professor Saunders has written:

From "'There is (either tenselessly or in any tense you like) a large brown cup on the table at 10 A.M. (Tuesday, July 8, 1964)" is true," it follows that the cup is large, that it is brown, that it is on the table, and that all of these things characterize the cup at 10 A.M. What does not follow is that the truth that the large brown cup is on the table at 10 A.M. is itself large or brown or on the table temporally located at 10 A.M. As we in fact use our language, it makes no more sense to attribute a time to truth than it does to ascribe to it a size, a color, or a place.12
Strictly speaking, then, we cannot temporally locate a truth in time and reason from the truth's temporal location that a later event signified by the truth is inevitable. Thus, if the object of Divine foreknowledge is truth, then Divine foreknowledge is not inconsistent with human freedom, for the object of that foreknowledge (i.e. truth) is bound by no temporal relations (i.e. it is eternal). All we can say is that it is an eternal truth that John chooses X at \( t_o \), and the eternal truth is true because John did choose X at \( t_o \). Truth must conform to the real. No event occurs because it is true that it occurs, but it is true that it occurs only because it does occur.

Perhaps, however, we should return again to Augustine's own analysis. As we have already observed in connection with his discussion of the first evil will, he seems unable to avoid thinking solely in causal categories. He does reject any and all pagan notions that fate or fortune controls the affairs and life of man, but he yet pictures the world as composed of a system of causal sequences traceable back to the all-powerful will of God. He further argues that this causal necessity, if properly understood, does not destroy free will.

We do not deny, of course, an order of causes in which the will of God is all-powerful....In His will is the supreme power which helps the good choices of created spirits, judges the evil ones, and orders all of them, giving powers to some and not to others....And absolutely all bodies are subject to the will of God; as, indeed, are all wills, too, since they have no power save what He gave them....Now, if by necessity we mean one that is in no way in our power, but which has its way even when our will is opposed to it, as is the case with the necessity to die, then, our choices of living well or ill obviously are not subject to this kind of necessity....On the other hand, if we take necessity to mean that in virtue of which something must be so and so or must happen in such and such a way, I do not see that we should be afraid of such necessity taking away our freedom of will.13 (Italics mine)

Let us not fail to notice the ambiguity in Augustine's use of the word "freedom." Earlier we alluded to the discussion in which he argues that free will is the solution to the problem of the origin of moral evil. Here his argument was that "there is no efficient cause of an evil will," and that the first bad will "was made bad by itself."14 But now we find him using "freedom" in a different sense—a causal sense. According to this usage, man is called "free" if he possesses the power to act in accordance with the dictates of his own will, even if those dictates are ultimately caused by God. At this point we only need impress that the latter kind of "freedom" is incapable of rendering man morally responsible. One is, of course, free to define "freedom" in any way he pleases. All I ask is that he accept the full implication of his definition, and the most important consequence of all causal definitions of "freedom" is that God is ultimately the sole cause of and thus responsible for defective wills.

The introduction by Augustine of the dubious analogy of darkness is unable to solve the dilemma. All defects are caused. Darkness is caused by those conditions which prevent the penetration of light, and defective wills are caused by those conditions which prevent the...
presence of good— conditions such as the free resolve of the will or perhaps the almighty will of God. Thus, I repeat, either God is not the cause of an evil will in which case something escapes Divine control, or God is the cause of and responsible for an evil will.

Even in his inconsistency, however, Augustine reveals an important fact; namely that the question of the universal causality of God has no logical relation to the question of God's foreknowledge. Whether John's choice of X at t2 is determined or undetermined, God's foreknowledge has no direct bearing on its occurrence. If John's choice is caused, then, given the total circumstances in which he makes his choice, the cause is the sole reason for his choice. And if John's choice is uncaused, then his own decision is the sole reason for his choice. We must, therefore, carefully distinguish two questions: (1) Does God know everything? And (2) does God cause everything? An affirmative answer to (1) escapes fatalism, but an affirmative answer to (2) does not.

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1. De libero arbitrio, Bk. II, Ch. XIX.
2. Ibid., Bk. III, Ch. I, 9-11.
3. City of God, Bk. XII, Ch. VI, p. 251.
4. To those who have never grasped the ultimate character of freedom, this type of reasoning will seem foolish. (Not even Augustine perceived all of its implications, although he was certainly on the right track.) There is, however, nothing in the slightest foolish about such reasoning, and we use it in other spheres of explanation quite often. Think of billiard ball A moving across the table and striking billiard ball B. Billiard ball B moves. Now if someone asks, "Why did billiard ball B move?" we properly answer, "A caused B to move." But if we are pressed, "Why did A cause B to move?" we have no further answer. We might seek to explain why A moved in the first place (e.g., it was caused by the cue stick), but this sheds no further light on the question of why A caused B given the circumstance of A striking B. The point is that the statement "A caused B" is the explanation, and it is meaningless to seek an explanation for the explanation. Now, similarly, when we say, "John arrived at a decision to choose X," we have explained the event. We can no more ask why John arrived at a decision to choose X than we can ask why A caused B. Decision-making would not be decision-making were some other explanation possible.
5. Ibid., Bk. XII, Ch. VI.
6. Ibid., Bk. XIV, Ch. XIII.
7. Ibid., Bk. V, Ch. IX.
8. Ibid., Bk. XII, Ch. IX.
9. Ibid., Bk. V, Ch. IX. The view that decision-making is uncaused because it is the consequence of freedom in operation, not only satisfied the demands of explanation, but it is phenomenologically satisfying as well. Our experience contains many examples. When choosing a course of action, we often do so by deciding to appropriate the reasons for the action. If someone asks of us why we walked across the street, our answer might be: "In order to get to the other side." If he presses us as to why we decided to walk on the other side, we might answer: "It is sunshining over here." Now some would argue that the sight of sunshine caused a desire for warmth, and the desire for warmth caused the choice. This may even be true, but there are many times when such an explanation will not satisfy experience. If our choice were not impulsive, but determined

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by a process of deliberation by which we arrived at a decision to cross the street, then we can no longer explain the event in causal terms. To be sure, the desire for warmth does not disappear, but in the deliberation of decision-making we transcend the desire. If we decide to act, the warmth becomes the immediate goal at which we aim, and, in this sense, it becomes the reason for, or object of, our action; but this goal or reason is itself appropriated by freedom, and our action is thus unpredictable. Surely we have all experienced decision-making for which the only possible explanation is that after a process of deliberating we arrived at a decision. We may appropriate goals at which we intend to aim; but neither the goals nor any desire for the goals cause the decision to appropriate the goals, even though both are part of the problem upon which freedom is working.

10. Ibid., Bk. V, Ch. X.
11. Ibid.
13. City of God, Bk. V, Ch. IX.

Editor:

I am writing with regard to fellow student Eric Lemmon’s recent letter in the Pasadena Star-News expressing his feelings about the reception given Sheriff Clark at his abortive lecture in our community. His disgust at the blatant violation of freedom of speech is legitimate. Unfortunately, he didn’t stop with his one good point.

The logic by which Mr. Lemmon seeks to discredit two seminary professors is irredeemable and unworthy of a graduate student. Apparently the two professors were seen "in the thick of the din" even as Mr. Lemmon was "in the thick of the din." The professors, however, were "seemingly elated" by the events transpiring, while Mr. Lemmon was not. Now I submit that "seeming elation" is hardly sufficient ground upon which to build a cogent case that they wanted to prevent Sheriff Clark from speaking.

The fact is that we, the party of Fuller professors and seminarians wearing "clergy" arm-bands, were present as a Christian witness. When Mr. Clark arose to speak, Mr. Lemmon should have noticed that the professors, far from being elated at the continuing "CORE" din which prevented the lecture, sat quietly and by example encouraged others to likewise hear what Sheriff Clark might have to say.

I am sorry that Mr. Lemmon has chosen to attribute bad faith to his professors. He has refused, for reasons which are his own, to take the expressed intentions of these professors at face value. His inference does not follow from the evidence he has introduced, and more importantly his evidence is factually incorrect. One wonders, therefore, what motivating factor shaped his conclusion.

In I Cor. 6:5-6, Paul says, "I speak to your shame. Is it so, that there is not a wise man among you? no, not one that shall be able to judge between his brethren? But brother goeth to law with brother, and that before the unbelievers." The situation of these verses is a legal one, but the underlying principle is clear: intra-Church issues ought not to be aired, let alone falsely aired, before the secular public. Mr. Lemmon might have aired his political opinions, but he ought not have slanderously maligned his fellow Christians and damaged the name of an evangelically Christian seminary.

We must then surmise that the action taken by Mr. Lemmon indicates questionable ethics. He has made unfounded claims, used poor logic, and acted contrary to a pattern of action established in Holy Scripture.

Sincerely,
David Garth